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The phrase ‘modal epistemology’ is most commonly used in two main ways nowadays. In one, it 
concerns the epistemology of necessity and possibility. In another, it refers to epistemologies 
which claim that for a belief to count as knowledge there has to be a modal tie either between the 
belief and its being true or between the cognitive habits of the believer and the believer’s beliefs 
tending to be accurate.1 Though it would be interesting to consider their inter-relations, this 
survey is of modal epistemology in the former, predominant sense. 
Modality is a flourishing topic in logic, philosophy and computer science. Work is dominated, 
though, by semantic, ontological, applied and, to a lesser extent, syntactic concerns. Work on 
modal epistemology though, is thin on the ground.2 The dearth of work on modal epistemology 
should be of special concern to anyone who wants to uphold some form of realism about 
modality, since it is epistemological concern that often motivates rejection of modal realism.3 
Another somewhat concerning fact is that recent writers on modal epistemology have largely 
neglected to engage with each other, especially over issues where there is disagreement in the 
literature. The same cannot be said of work concerning modal logic, modal semantics and modal 
metaphysics: fairly widespread engagement with one’s peers is the order of the day in these 
 
1. For a stimulating study of modal epistemologies in the second sense, see Lars Bo Gundersen, Dispositional 
Theories of Knowledge (Acumen, 2003). George Bealer, ‘Modal Epistemology and the Rationalist 
Renaissance’, in Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility (Oxford 
University Press, 2002), pp. 71–125, p. 71 relates three senses of ‘modal epistemology’, concerning (i) 
knowledge of the necessary and the possible; (ii) investigation into what knowledge is possible and (iii) ‘the 
intersection of the first two: the theory of possible modal knowledge—that is, of what modal knowledge is 
possible’. I cannot report having seen any other occurrence of usage (ii) in the literature. It seems to me that 
looking into (i) involves the others, but anyhow I don’t here take the trouble to be quite as particular as Bealer. 
2. Compare Peter van Inwagen, ‘Modal Epistemology’, Philosophical Studies, 92 (1998), pp. 67–84, p. 75 and 
John Divers, Possible Worlds (Routledge, 2002), p. 164. 
3. If George Molnar, Powers: An Essay in Ontology (Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 124 is right that anti-
realism about immanent modality leads to a more thoroughgoing anti-realism, then the need for a modal 
epistemology becomes even more pressing. 
                                                                                                                                                                
Please cite the official published version of this article:  





fields. One cannot help but suspect that the relative lack of both industry and progress in modal 
epistemology may partly be due to the lack of such engagement. 
The onus is upon you to provide an epistemology of the modal if and only if you are a 
semantic realist about modality. For the sake of this discussion, I presume an affirmative answer 
to the question of whether we should be semantic realists about the modal. What sort of 
epistemology does semantic realism require? What relationships obtain between the modal, the a 
priori and the empirical? 
Modal knowledge is a paradigmatic example of a form of knowledge apt for classification as 
fundamentally a priori. Kripkean necessity a posteriori does not undermine this tenet, since 
Kripke takes each instance of necessary a posteriori knowledge to be derived, via modus ponens, 
from a necessary a priori major premise and an empirical minor premise.4 For example, we infer 
that necessarily, water is H2O from the empirical premise that water’s chemical formula is H2O 
and the a priori premise that if a chemical stuff has a given chemical formula then it has that 
formula of necessity.5 
Recent approaches to the epistemology of the necessary a posteriori largely emanate from the 
Kripkean model in one way or another. Colin McGinn and Christopher Peacocke both try to 
show that the modal aspect of all modal knowledge boils down to a priori knowledge and both, 
though particularly Peacocke, address the question of what principles are fit to feature as major 
premises in arguments to necessity a posteriori.6 
George Bealer develops the Kripkean model by arguing that rationalism is limited to the 
modal major premise, that intuitions (so prominent in Kripke) carry evidential weight and that 
only a rationalist account of the ultimate principles fit to feature as modal major premises is 
adequate.7 
Alan Sidelle appropriates the Kripkean model, giving it an ontologically anti-realist twist. He 
holds that the major premise is analytic and that analyticity is a matter of stipulation.8 
Crawford Elder modifies the standard account by arguing that the major premise is empirically 
known and that recognising necessity a posteriori does not require commitment to trans-
empirical modality.9 
 
4. Saul A. Kripke, ‘Identity and Necessity’, in Milton K. Munitz (ed.) Identity and Necessity (New York 
University Press, 1971), pp. 135–64, p. 153. For discussion, see Jonathan Dancy, An Introduction to 
Contemporary Epistemology (Blackwell, 1985), pp. 219–21; George Bealer, ‘The Limits of Scientific 
Essentialism’ Philosophical Perspectives, 1 (1987), pp. 289–365, pp. 292, 300; Bob Hale, ‘Modality’, in Bob 
Hale and Crispin Wright (eds.) A Companion to the Philosophy of Language (Blackwell, 1996), pp. 487–514, 
p. 492; Christopher Peacocke, Being Known (Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 41 and Crawford L. Elder, 
Real Natures and Familiar Objects (MIT Press, 2004), pp. 4–7. 
5. The example follows Hale, ‘Modality’, p. 492. 
6. Colin McGinn, ‘Modal Reality’, in R. Healey (ed.) Reduction, Time and Reality (Cambridge University Press, 
1981), pp 143–187; Peacocke, Being Known, Ch. 4, incorporating his ‘Metaphysical Necessity: Understanding, 
Truth and Epistemology’, Mind, 106 (1997), pp. 521–74. 
7. See the aforementioned works by Bealer and his ‘The A Priori’, in John Greco and Ernest Sosa (eds.) 
Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Blackwell, 1998), pp. 243–70. Bealer’s view contrasts with that of Brian 
Ellis, Scientific Essentialism (Cambridge University Press, 2001), who rejects rationalism. 
8. Alan Sidelle, Necessity, Essence and Individuation: A Defense of Conventionalism (Cornell University Press, 
1989). 
9. Real Natures and Familiar Objects. See also ‘An Epistemological Defence of Realism About Necessity’, 
Philosophical Quarterly, 42 (1992), pp. 317–36. 
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Semantic realism about modality includes moderate conventionalism and ontological realism. 
Moderate conventionalism, a position subscribed to by the logical positivists and revived, in a 
modified form, by Sidelle, holds that modal truth is not grounded in extra-mental reality, but is a 
mere reflection of our linguistic conventions.10 
The ontological realist, meanwhile, holds one of the following positions:  
 
Objectual modal realism: non-actual but real possible worlds are the ultimate truthmakers for 
modal claims. (No worlds are modal in nature. Modal truth at a world is relative to actual truth 
at other worlds.) 
 
Non-objectual modal realism: non-actual possible worlds are not the ultimate truthmakers for 
modal claims. Rather, necessity and possibility are immanent in the actual world. (The actual 
world is modal in nature. Non-actual worlds either do not exist or are ontologically dependent 
upon modality.) 
 
Empiricists and modal non-cognitivists typically view ontological realism of either hue as 
ontologically profligate and epistemologically mysterious. Talk of a peculiar, necessity-detecting 
faculty being a requirement of realism is invoked partly to debunk realism. Often, such hostility 
to modal realism is premised on a causal model of knowledge whereby we know an object by 
means of its causal interaction with our cognitive faculties and the status of a belief that p as 
knowledge is tied up with direct or indirect observational evidence for p. 
 
 
Conservativeness and the Analogy with Mathematics 
 
Modality and mathematics are commonly held to be epistemologically akin in that a causal 
model of knowledge can accommodate neither. The stock response of the modal realist is ‘so 
much the worse for causal models of knowledge’. The fault lies with the sparse epistemology, 
not the lavish ontology. As part of this response, the realist sometimes says something like the 
following. ‘Look: we can’t know mathematical truths causally. We do know mathematical truths. 
So, a causal model of knowledge is inadequate anyway. We don’t need to worry, then, about the 
fact that modal knowledge can’t be accounted for causally.’ 
The analogy with mathematics occurs in, among other places, the work of Colin McGinn (a 
non-objectual modal realist) and David Lewis (the arch objectual realist).11 At least on the 
surface, objectual modal realism looks more epistemologically suspect than non-objectual 
realism, since we are in perceptual contact with the actual world but cannot be with non-actual 
worlds. If modality is immanent in the actual world rather than transcending it, then, as a matter 
at least of prima facie intuition, modality is less seriously epistemologically puzzling. It is 
striking, too, that among the ontological realists it is the non-objectual realists who have tended 
 
10. Against Sidelle’s view, see Stephen Yablo’s review, Philosophical Review, 101 (1992), pp. 878–81; and Elder, 
Real Natures and Familiar Objects, Ch. 1. 
11. McGinn, ‘Modal Reality’; David Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds (Blackwell, 1986), pp. 108–9. 
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both to acknowledge the difficulty of providing an epistemology for modality and risen to the 
challenge of attempting to do it, rather than just settling for the sort of rejoinder to the causal 
epistemologist voiced by Lewis and summarised in the previous paragraph.12  
It seems to me to be a central (though largely implicit) question in the recent literature as to 
whether or not modality is empirically conservative. I believe this notion to lack satisfactory 
definition in the literature, but the basic idea is that modality is empirically conservative if and 
only if adding modalising to a (putatively) non-modal empirical theory would not alter the 
empirical consequences of the theory. McGinn13 views modality as akin to mathematics in being 
empirically conservative, while Peacocke14 views a commitment to the conservativeness of the 
modal as desirable in a philosophy of modality. 
McGinn employs the notion of conservativeness in characterising modality as trans-empirical. 
He claims that modality is trans-empirical in the sense that it is, though truth-apt, empirically 
conservative. He takes it to follow from this that modality is also trans-empirical in the (I think 
separate) sense that, though truth-apt, our knowledge of the modal truth could not be based on 
direct observation, indirect observation or argument to the best explanation of observed 
phenomena. 
Peacocke is non-committal on whether modality is empirically conservative but he agrees that 
modal knowledge could not be based on direct observation, indirect observation or argument to 
the best explanation of observed phenomena. It seems, anyway, that endorsing conservativeness 
is neither necessary nor sufficient for commitment to modal rationalism. It is not sufficient, 
because to claim that a discourse is empirically conservative does not (unlike commitment to 
rationalism about its epistemic justification) involve commitment to its truth-aptness. It is not 
necessary, since the rationalist need not reject what Peacocke calls a “partially modal conception 
of reality” associated with one kind of semantic primitivism about modality to the effect that 
“there is no relevant non-modal segment of discourse of which modal principles might be a 
conservative extension”.15 
Though commitment to the trans-empirical status of modality, in the second sense I marked 
out, is apparently a sufficient condition for commitment to rationalism, it is not a necessary one. 
In order to be a rationalist about the modal, one need only claim that some modal truths are trans-
empirical, not that modality is always trans-empirical. Again, the consistency of rationalism with 
a partially modal conception of reality bears this out. 
Though they do not use the term, the anti-rationalists Elder, Ellis and Miščević reject the thesis 
of conservativeness and the thesis of the trans-empirical status of modality.16 Elder is most 
 
12. Otavio Bueno and Scott Shalkowski, ‘A Plea for a Modal Realist Epistemology’, Acta Analytica, 15 (2000), 
pp. 175–93, complain about Lewis’s lack of provision of a positive epistemology and question the legitimacy 
of the analogy with mathematics. For a more sympathetic discussion of Lewis, see Divers, Possible Worlds, 
Ch. 9. 
13. ‘Modal Reality’, pp. 178–82. 
14. Being Known, p. 175. 
15. Ibid.. Peacocke regards commitment to the conservativeness of modality as not required by his principle-based 
account of modality. It seems to me that a problem with the notion of conservativeness, as it stands, is that it is 
not clear whether it requires that there is such a non-modal segment. 
16. See the works by Ellis and Elder cited above and Nenad Miščević, ‘Explaining Modal Intuition’, Acta 
Analytica, 18 (2003), pp. 5–41. 
5 
explicit on this, holding both that we can discover necessities by solely empirical means and that 
an essentialist claim will issue in different empirical consequences from an unmodalised claim. 
Ellis’s work, meanwhile, seems to suggest that the postulation of modality in nature provides the 
best explanation of observed phenomena and of features of the laws of nature. McGinn 
anticipated such a view, which is partly why he took the trouble to argue for conservativeness. A 
modalised description of an actual world phenomenon does not, thinks McGinn, add any 
predictive content to a description expunged of the modality. Nor can observation, per se, serve 
to justify a modal claim. 
Whether or not the literature contains a perspicuous definition of the notion of empirical 
conservativeness for modality, there is certainly a lack of engagement among those who view (or 
hope to view) the modal as conservative and those who (without using the word or mentioning 
him) make claims either explicitly or implicitly inconsistent with McGinn’s view.17 
 
 
Conceiving, Intuiting and Possibility 
 
The question of whether such psychological operations as conceiving and intuiting serve as 
guides to possibility is a more overt, and more widely discussed, topic than that of the whether 
modality is empirically conservative and/or trans-empirical. There is also the related question of 
whether the stronger relationship of entailment ever holds between such propositions as: 
 
x intuits that p  




It is possible that p. 
 
There is an unavoidable air of stipulation to such discussions, since there is no widespread 
agreement among philosophers as to what we mean by conceives and intuits and the everyday 
notions are hopelessly imprecise. 
It seems to me that the question of whether modality is trans-empirical is prior to that of 
whether p’s being the intentional object of some psychological operation either entails or serves 
as evidence that p. Surely, we only are only forced to resort to such hazy appeal if we really 
cannot know the modal by (relatively straightforward, less hazy) empirical means, whether direct 
or indirect. 
Nevertheless, claims which would, if true, be genuinely informative can be made about the 
relationship between the operations of our purported psychological faculties and possibility. Both 
traditionally and recently, the appeal to the idea that p’s being the object of some such 
 
17. Miščević’s article is the only discussion I have found that engages with named parties from both camps. The 
article, though containing numerous editing errors, is philosophically worthwhile. 
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psychological operation serves as evidence for the possibility that p has featured in both 
rationalist and empiricist accounts of modal knowledge. 
Stephen Yablo holds that my conceiving that p gives me defeasible grounds for holding that it 
is possible that p.18 Colloquially, ‘conceivable’ just means believable, whereas, in the technical 
sense, p is conceivable only if it seems possible that p. ‘Seems’ here is taken in an intellectual 
sense. “Whatever you find [philosophically] conceivable, you are prima facie entitled to regard 
as metaphysically possible.”19 Philosophical conceivability does not entail believability. It’s 
conceivable that I should never have existed, but not believable that I never have. Believability 
does not entail philosophical conceivability, since, for example, neither “Goldbach’s conjecture 
nor its negation is conceivable in the relevant sense” though both, given our current epistemic 
situation, are believable.20 
Though Bealer rejects conceivability as a guide to possibility,21 his position is rather analogous 
to Yablo’s except that Bealer holds that it is my intuiting that p that gives me defeasible grounds 
for holding that it is possible that p. For Bealer, when I intuit that p then it seems (in an 
intellectual sense) to me that p. 
I detect three other strands in the literature concerning the relationship between p’s being the 
object of a certain intention and it being possible that p. 
Outright dismissal. According to Ellis, what we find conceivable is determined not by the 
nature of reality, but by how our minds work. Modal reality is out there, so we have no grounds 
for thinking that conceiving, intuiting or imagining that p gives us evidence that it is possible 
that p.22 
Epistemic naturalism. In contrast to Ellis, Miščević holds that our cognitive habits are as they 
are because they have been shaped by the natural world over the course of evolution.23 We 
should therefore not be surprised if it turns out that we have modal intuitions which track the 
deep modal structure of reality. 
Conceivability entails possibility. Chalmers commits to probable entailment between a kind of 
conceivability (in a technical sense I won’t explore) and possibility.24 
 
 
Two Sorts of Modal Knowledge 
 
As a matter of orthodoxy, mathematical and logical truths, if necessary, are taken to differ 
epistemologically from Kripkean necessities a posteriori. At least, our methods of arrival at 
knowledge of these truths are taken to differ. Mathematical and logical truths can be known 
directly. Necessities a posteriori, as the standard post-Kripkean account has it, can only be 
 
18. Stephen Yablo, ‘Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility?’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 53 
(1993), pp. 1–42. 
19. Ibid., p. 34. 
20. Ibid., p. 11. 
21. ‘Modal Epistemology and the Rationalist Renaissance’, pp. 75–7. 
22. Scientific Essentialism, e.g., pp. 54, 280. 
23. ‘Explaining Modal Intuition’. 
24. David J. Chalmers, ‘Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?’, in Gendler and Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability 
and Possibility, pp. 145–200, esp. pp. 194–5. 
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derived rather than axiomatic. For ease of reference, and for want of a better way of doing things, 
I will dub such necessities ‘hypothetical’, as opposed to the ‘categorical’ necessities purportedly 
known directly. The main reason for using the term ‘hypothetical’ necessity is that, despite my 
earlier claim that modal knowledge is an archetypal candidate for classification as a priori, I do 
not wish to beg the question against some recent thinkers who seek to reject the a priori but 
retain the modal.25 I would be so doing if I referred to hypothetical necessity as the ‘necessary a 
posteriori’, since such thinkers so deem all necessity (except, in at least one case, analytic 
necessities).26 Still, I need some way of marking out the orthodox distinction as a prerequisite for 
my discussion. In any case, the term ‘hypothetical’ seems apt in this context, since: (i) the 
objects of such necessities are not necessary existents, as the Kripkean notion of weak necessity 
is precisely intended to capture; (ii) we know them only if we know that the antecedent of a 
given known conditional is true. 
It seems that the primary epistemological question for the semantic realist is that of how we 
know the categorically necessary. On no going theory that I have encountered is it denied that 
knowledge of the hypothetically necessary is dependent on knowledge of the categorically 
necessary (even if some would have it that we can know necessity without appeal to rationalism). 
Some writers on modality don’t seem to address this relationship at all,27 but no-one , as far as I 
know, voices such denial. There was a time, very recently, when it could have been said that no 
contemporary essentialist questions the need for the a priori in an account of how we know the 





Partly in reaction to Lewis, semantic realists who reject objectual realism are agreed that there 
should be a close connection between that which makes a modal truth true and the means by 
which we come to know it. McGinn describes this as a condition upon ontological imputations.28 
Peacocke refers to it as ‘the Integration Challenge’.29 
Sidelle attempts such integration by arguing that all necessity stems from categorical analytic 
necessity. The moderate conventionalist traditionally had it that necessity and analyticity are co-
extensive. Sidelle does not subscribe to this view, holding that there are a posteriori necessities. 
However, he does hold that all necessity boils down to analyticity, since the a posteriori 
necessities owe their necessity (though not their truth) to the analyticity of the major premises in 
modus ponens inferences to necessity a posteriori. Analyticity, in turn, Sidelle holds to be a 
matter of convention. 
 
25. The thinkers are Ellis, Elder, and Miščević. 
26. Ellis, Scientific Essentialism, views analytic necessities as true by convention and, I would hazard, trivially a 
priori, though he has it that we need not appeal to the a priori in accounting for essentialist necessities 
pertaining to the objects and laws of the actual world. 
27. E.g., Ellis, Scientific Essentialism. 
28. McGinn, ‘Modal Reality’, pp. 146–7. 
29. Peacocke, Being Known, Ch. 1. 
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Other recent semantic realists who have addressed the epistemology of categorical necessity 
have mainly done so by appeal to rationalism. Modal rationalisms certainly have a more 
prevalent and developed profile in the literature than do their pro-modal but anti-rationalist 
rivals. 
Bealer and Peacocke are among the leading exponents of modal rationalism. Both appeal to 
considerations concerning the possession conditions on concepts, though this plays a more 
central and technically developed role in Peacocke’s account than in Bealer’s. Intuition is the 
central notion in Bealer’s rationalism. 
On Peacocke’s account, a thinker’s a priori knowledge that p consists in their cognitive 
competence in using the concepts employed in p. This will encompass (at least covert) grasp of 
principles of possibility. These branch into principles of possibility at the level of sense and 
principles, dubbed ‘constitutive principles of possibility’ at the level of extension. Such 
principles are instances of the following principle: 
 
Unified Modal Extension Principle. An assignment s is admissible only if: for any concept 
C, the semantic value of C according to s is the result of applying the same rule as is applied in 
the determination of the actual semantic value of C. (Being Known, p. 136) 
 
Principles at the level of sense account for a priori truths of mathematics and logic, while the 
constitutive principles of possibility underwrite modal metaphysical knowledge in a wider sense. 
Peacocke asserts, rather than argues for, such constitutive principles as that where “P is a 
property which is an object x’s fundamental kind, then an assignment is inadmissible if it counts 
the proposition x is P as false”, 30 and that an assignment is inadmissible if it breaches Kripkean 
doctrines on the necessity of origin.31 There is an apparent lacuna in Peacocke’s account in that it 
does not elaborate on how constitutive principles of possibility are known. 
Bealer’s modal epistemology seeks to provide a full articulation of the acquisition of modal 
knowledge. The account encompasses the basic claims fit to feature as major premises in 
arguments to hypothetical necessity. Such claims are ultimately justified by rational intuition. 
Intuition is not some strange cognitive faculty. “To have an intuition that A is just for it to seem 
to you that A” and such “seeming is intellectual, not sensory or introspective (or imaginative)”.32 
Intuitions are either “noninferential beliefs regarding the applicability of a concept to a 
hypothetical case” or “mental states having a strong modal tie” with such beliefs.33 This, in turn, 
requires an explanation of why intuitions have ‘evidential weight’.34 He initiates his account by 
distinguishing, without suggesting that the divisions are hard and fast, between naturalistic, 
category and content concepts: 
 
30. Ibid., p. 145, after the thought of David Wiggins, Sameness and Substance (Blackwell, 1980). 
31. Ibid., pp. 145–6, after Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Blackwell, 1980). 
32. Bealer, ‘The A Priori’, p. 247.  
33. ‘The Limits of Scientific Essentialism’, p. 300. Bealer unites the two forms of modal epistemology 
distinguished in my first paragraph. ‘The A Priori’, p. 247 inclines away from the former partly on the basis 
that intuition, unlike belief, is a form of seeming. See also ‘Modal Epistemology and the Rationalist 
Renaissance’, p. 73 for differences between intuition, imagination and belief. 
34. On this dialectic, see ‘The Limits of Scientific Essentialism’, pp. 300–2. Playing devil’s advocate, Bealer asks 
why intuitions should be any more weighty than gamblers’ hunches. 
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Naturalistic concepts . . . include, for example, the concepts of water, heat, gold, lemon, 
arthritis, beech, elm and so forth . . . . Examples of category concepts are the concepts of stuff, 
compositional stuff, functional stuff, substance, quality, quantity, action, artificial, natural, 
cause, reason, person, etc. Examples of content concepts are familiar phenomenal qualities 
(pain, itching, tingling-sensation, etc.) and basic mental relations (knowing, perceiving, 
deciding, loving, etc.).35 
 
Naturalistic intuitions have evidential weight insofar as they are instances (albeit empirically 
informed instances) of category/content intuitions that do not employ naturalistic concepts. The 
latter intuitions, when correct, provide modal knowledge fit for input as major premises in 
arguments to necessity a posteriori. For example, the intuition (supposing it correct) that nothing 
other than H2O counts as water derives its legitimacy from the empirical knowledge that 
paradigm samples of water have the chemical formula H2O, together with the a priori category 
intuition that “If paradigm samples of a compositional stuff have a certain complex composition, 
then items lacking that composition would not qualify as samples of the compositional stuff”.36 
Scientific essentialism depends on intuitions counting as evidence; naturalistic intuitions 
counting as evidence depends on non-naturalistic intuitions counting as evidence; non-
naturalistic intuitions counting as evidence depends on there being “an autonomous level of 
category and content concepts, determinate possession of which must be explained in a 
traditional, noncausal way and theoretical knowledge of which may be obtained absolutely a 
priori”.37 So, scientific essentialism depends on a form of rationalism. By the lights of Bealer’s 
moderate rationalism, there is a modal tie between our intuitions and the truth. Necessarily, when 
a person possesses a concept then in (at least) most cases in which they are to make a non-
inferential judgment about whether or not that concept applies to an elementary hypothetical 
case, their judgment will coincide with the truth.38 Since an intuition is closely akin to such a 
judgement, intuitions have evidential worth.39 We can see, then, why Bealer calls his 
epistemologies of the modal and the a priori ‘modal reliabilism’ and that, in appealing to 
conditions constitutive of the full possession of concepts, Bealer and Peacocke are kindred 
epistemologists.40 For Bealer, a given intuition is not necessarily primitively compelling. Rather, 
the outcome of rational intuition may be arrived at via a kind of reflective equilibrium or 




35. ‘The Limits of Scientific Essentialism’, p. 295. See also ‘Modal Epistemology and the Rationalist 
Renaissance’, p. 107. 
36. ‘The Limits of Scientific Essentialism’, p. 304. Over pp. 310–4 Bealer extends modal intuitionism to the 
choice of basic principles in logic, metaphysics and mathematics. 
37. Ibid., p. 309. 
38. Ibid., p. 319; see ‘The A Priori’, p. 254 for a weaker claim. 
39. Ibid., pp. 319-20. 
40. Also, both are fallibilists about a priori justification and adopt dialectical, as opposed to foundationalist, views 
of the role of a priori belief in total theory. See Bealer, ‘Modal Epistemology and the Rationalist Renaissance’, 




As far as I know, no writer in the recent literature is a rationalist about hypothetical necessity in 
the sense of believing that we know hypothetical necessities independently of experience. 
Rather, the debate about the status of the modal major premises in modus ponens arguments to 
hypothetical necessity is where the anti-rationalists take the action to be. In this, I agree: the story 
does not end there, though. What of the epistemology for logical modality and, in particular, for 
the modality attaching to principles that embody valid patterns of deductive inference? The 
tendency among the anti-rationalists is either to overlook the epistemological status of inferential 
principles altogether or else to provide an account that is, in my view, sketchy and unconvincing. 
Elder, for example, seems to think that if he has demonstrated that there is an empirical test for 
distinguishing between the essential and the accidental (be it concerning properties or concerning 
universal generalisations) he has thereby refuted rationalism. On the contrary, the refutation of 
rationalism requires a further stage: namely, an argument that logical knowledge does not require 
the a priori. Among the anti-rationalist ontological realists about the modal, only Ellis can be 
said to have really addressed this task and no-one has done so very recently.41 Basically, his 
strategy was to adopt a form of psychologism according to which logical laws are laws of 
thought and akin to laws of physics insofar as they are abstractions from actual phenomena. It is 
highly plausible that one has to be a realist about logic if one wants to be a realist about the 
modal. On Ellis’s onetime account, it would appear that in order to be a realist about logic one 





The predominant tendency among ontological realists about the modal has been to respond to 
epistemologically motivated critics of realism not by supplying a detailed epistemology but by 
adverting to the superiority qua ontology, of their own position over that of their critics. Even 
McGinn’s position has this basic form,43 though he has done more than most to try to explain 
why modality is epistemologically problematic and what is at stake in debates about its 
epistemological status. 
Nevertheless, as we have seen, there has been a recent growth in interest among ontological 
realists in providing a positive epistemology for the modal, with theories being advanced from a 
rationalist camp and a camp hostile to rationalism. Let’s hope that greater engagement will occur 
among writers both within and between these camps. If it does, we can perhaps expect greater 
progress in the project of providing an epistemology for modality. 
 
41. Brian Ellis, Rational Belief Systems (Blackwell, 1979). 
42. In Scientific Essentialism, Ellis seems to seek to combine conventionalism about de dicto modality with 
realism about de re modality. For reasons I can’t go into here, I don’t see how this combination can work. 
43. As well as ‘Modal Reality’, see his Logical Properties (Oxford University Press, 2000), in which he takes 
necessity to stand in the way of philosophical naturalism. 
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